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The 2011 off the Paciﬁc Coast of Tohoku Earthquake severely damaged agricultural facilities in Tohoku district, damaged coastal dikes and
farmland behind the embankment, and disrupted lifelines, such as irrigation systems, in districts far from the coastline.
This report introduces an outline of the damaged agricultural facilities on the basis of the investigations made during inspection visits to those
facilities by National Institute for Rural Engineering (NIRE). In Fukushima Prefecture, many small earth dams, other dams, and pipelines were
damaged. Among a total of 3730 dams and small earth dams in Fukushima Prefecture, 745 small earth dams were damaged by sliding failure or
settlement of embankment. Small earth dams at 3 locations were breached, inﬂicting severe damage on the regions downstream.
The embankments of two dams for agricultural use, the Nishigo dam and the Hatori dam, located in the Tohoku region, were damaged. In parts
of Fukushima Prefecture where trunk pipelines for agricultural use have a total length of 17.8 km, at 7 places pipelines were either exposed or
experienced leakages, and severe deformation which did not satisfy standard values was noted at 149 locations.
This paper reports the state of damage typical to each type of facility and the restoration measures that were undertaken.
& 2014 The Japanese Geotechnical Society. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The 2011 Off the Paciﬁc Coast of Tohoku Earthquake
caused extensive damage such as the ﬂoating and ejection of
buried structures as well as the failure of some small earth
dams. Mohri et al. 1995 performed a detailed survey on the
state of a main agricultural pipeline that broke during the 1993
Hokkaido Nansei-Oki Earthquake, and found that the damage
was focused on the ancillary structure. Koseki and Matsuo
(1997), Yasuda et al. (1995), and Yamaguchi et al. (2012a)
described the ground liquefaction mechanism that caused
manholes and pipelines to ﬂoat up to the ground surface.0.1016/j.sandf.2014.06.025
4 The Japanese Geotechnical Society. Production and hosting by
g author.
ss: ymohri@affrc.go.jp (Y. Mohri).
der responsibility of The Japanese Geotechnical Society.In Japan, while there have been no reports of the severe
failure of large dams constructed with earthquake resistant
design, Yamaguchi et al. (2012b) reported on the seismic
behavior of embankment dams during an earthquake. Regard-
ing small earth dams, Hasegawa and Murakami (1996) and
Tani (1996) described the damage features and mechanism of
the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu Earthquake. Large earthquakes
have resulted in the damage of a huge number of small earth
dams. For example, the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu Earthquake
resulted in damage to 1222 of the 51,000 small earth dams in
Hyogo Prefecture, and the 1983 Japan Sea Chubu Earthquake
resulted in damage at 1300 locations at small earth dams in
Akita Prefecture and Aomori Prefecture. All of these small
earth dams damaged by earthquake were constructed before
the enactment of the seismic design standard (Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2009), while other smallElsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607 589dams constructed in accordance with the seismic design
standard have been safe. However, it is not clear enough
how safe they actually are from a hypothetical earthquake like
a Level 2 earthquake.
The 2011 off the Paciﬁc Coast of Tohoku Earthquake
breached 0.1% of small earth dams in Fukushima Prefecture,
showing that almost all of the small earth dams remained in
sound condition. This paper reports on the state of the
damaged earth dams and pipelines.Sandy silt
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Medium sand
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Fig. 2. Result from boring survey conducted before earthquake at Kumado
region in Fukushima Pref. (at Ooikenishi Conbined Junction in Fig. 4).2. Earthquake ground motion in Sukagawa City,
Fukushima
The Kumado river region is located in the west part of
Sukagawa City in Fukushima Prefecture, as shown in Figs. 1
and 4. A large-diameter pipeline is installed underground, as
roughly shown in Fig. 2, in soil comprised of sandy silt with an
N value (Standard Penetration Test, SPT) of 10 or less at a
depth of about 10 m below the ground surface, and coarse/
medium sand with an N value of more than 20 at a depth of
about 10 m and deeper. In the hilly and mountainous areas, the
ground at the installation depth of the pipeline consists of
mainly silt and clay with an N value of 5–10.
Data on the earthquake ground motions of the 2011 off the
Paciﬁc Coast of Tohoku Earthquake is shown in Fig. 3: EW
acceleration at the K-Net Sukagawa site(FKS017) recorded at
Sukagawa City in Fukushima Prefecture. The maximum
acceleration of the EW motion was 492.9 cm/s2. The duration
of this motion at the Sukagawa site over 50 cm/s2 continued
for 100 s despite being more than 200 km from the epicenter,
which was an earthquake motion never which had been
experienced. The distribution of the duration of acceleration
over 50 cm/s2 was located from the Tohoku region to Kanto
region (Sasaki et al., 2012). The duration times in the TohokuThe 1993 Hokkaido Nansei Oki 
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Fig. 1. Locations of earthquake epicenter and investigations.
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Fig. 3. Accelelation records at Sukagawa (K-net).region were greater than in the Kanto region. The very long
duration time of the main shock resulted in the signiﬁcant
deformation of the ground and soil structure, and induced
severe liquefaction of soil (Yasuda et al., 2012). A detailed
investigation of the river embankments throughout the Tohoku
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Fig. 5. Cross section for shallow depth of the cover construction method.
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607590and Kanto region was conducted by Oka et al. (2012) and
Sasaki et al. (2012), and the results showed that the main
causes of damage were (1) liquefaction of the foundations and
the river embankments, and (2) the long duration of earth-
quake. Both the acceleration and the duration time induced the
severe damage of soil structures. Such strong motion over such
a long duration produced high excess pore water pressure and
more deformation of small earth dams and back ﬁll sand of
buried pipelines, and resulted in the slip failure of small earth
dams and caused buried pipelines to ﬂoat to the surface.
3. Damage to pipelines
The main agricultural pipeline in the Kumado river region
was completed by March 2009. After coming into use in 2010,
the pipelines supplied all the irrigation water. The main
pipeline, as shown in Fig. 4, starts at the Hiwada diversion
work at the intake from the Kumado River and covers a
distance of 17.8 km before it reaches Sukagawa City (Ariyoshi
et al., 2012). The pipeline system consists of mainly Fiber
Reinforced Plastic Mortar pipes (FRPM) ranging from
Φ1500 mm to Φ2600 mm in diameter, but steel pipes and
ductile iron pipes are also used in some sections. No serious
damage was done to the pipes.
In areas with a high groundwater level, the liquefaction of
backﬁll material caused the buried pipes to ﬂoat up of 1.4 m
because of buoyancy, while heavy concrete structures sank as
much as 50 cm. The ejection of a joint section of pipe around
the structure caused considerable damage, including a large
amount of water leakage and surrounding soil washout. For
these reasons, not only partial repairs but also pipe replacement
and the change of backﬁll materials was required to resume the
water supply through the main pipeline. The pipeline itself,
with crushed gravel as backﬁll, suffered no signiﬁcant damage
or deformation, and showed its earthquake resistance.Fig. 4. Plan view of Kumado river irrigation3.1. Outline of damaged pipelines
The entire main pipeline in this region, which was ﬁlled with
water, was affected by the ground motion. According to the design,
the allowable internal water pressure for irrigation was 0.35 MPa.
Superﬁcial damage to the pipeline included leakage, road settle-
ment and liquefaction of back ﬁll sand of buried pipe. In addition, a
detailed investigation into the inner pipes showed nine points with
leakage, three points with potential leakage, three points with large
settlement and bumps around the valve chambers, three points with
settlement of the road crossing the pipeline, and three points with
cracks in the road used for pipeline maintenance. This type of
damage occurred largely as a result of the liquefaction of the
backﬁll sand, which reduced the bearing capacity of the pipe
structure and caused the structure to move, ﬂoat or settle out of
position, leading to the separation of the pipe joints.
3.2. Damage to individual facilities
Pipeline around Ohya No. 7 manhole(air valve works
construction completed in 2008)project in Sukagawa City (main pipeline).
Photo 1. Settlement of ground around diversion .
Photo 2. Joint ejection at reducer .
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607 591A Φ2400 mm FRPM pipe was used for pipes around the
manhole. The mean depth of the earth covering for the pipes
was speciﬁed as about 1.6 m or more, but because the shallow-
cover construction method was used, which employs crushed
gravel and a geogrid, the actual depth was about 70% of their
diameter. When the pipe was installed at a shallow depth, as
shown in Fig. 5, crushed gravel around the pipe was wrapped
with a geogrid for reinforcement. The backﬁll material above
the center line of the pipe side was crushed gravel (C-30) with
a D value (degree of compaction) of 92% or more against the
maximum standard proctor density. Also, the pipes in this
section did not ﬂoat and they had maintained a designed
elevation and joint spacing with no obstruction to the water
ﬂow. Consequently, it was estimated that they had stably
ensured a water-sealing performance.
3.3. Pipeline around Gohonmatsu No. 1 diversion structure
(construction completed in 2009)
A Φ2000 mm FRPM pipe was adopted for pipes around the
diversion structure. Crushed gravel, and sand equivalent to SF,
was backﬁlled to the lower and upper parts of the center line of
the pipe, respectively. The pipe was installed underground
with a depth of earth cover of 2.5 m. One bend pipe with
bending angle of 60 was connected another bend pipe with
bending angle of 49 between the three FRPM pipes (4-m pipe)
and two short pipes (2-m pipe). First bend pipe was connected
to the diversion structure. Furthermore, a shaped pipe reducer,
which connected the Φ2000 mm pipe to the Φ2400 mm pipe,
was installed at a distance of 18 m from the diversion.
As shown in Fig. 6 and Photo 1, the soft ground foundation
for the diversion works was replaced with crushed gravel to
improve the bearing capacity. For this reason, the embankment
of the structure settled only 100 mm deeper than the design
elevation, but extensive settlement of the surrounding ground
created a bump of 500 mm between the diversion structure and
the ground surface. Sand boiled by liquefaction was widely
deposited on the surface of the surrounding ground. The
upstream and downstream pipes connected to the structure
settled 206 mm and 353 mm, respectively. The joints for the
upstream and downstream pipes were ejected 360 mm and
465 mm at the crown of the pipes, respectively. The fact that
the manholes and pipes generally settled suggests that the
settlement of the ground at depths below the pipes was
extensive, and the liquefaction of the backﬁll sand resulted
in the considerable deformation of the pipes, causing them to
be easily ejected and resulting in the fracture of the pipeline.Settlement
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Fig. 6. Cross section for Gohonmatsu diversion.The pipes were slightly deﬂected, with a horizontal deﬂection
rate of about 0.6% (against diameter).
The specially shaped pipe (a steel reducer connecting
between Φ2000 mm and Φ2400 mm diameter pipes) that
was installed close to this diversion structure was completely
displaced. Due to its gradually tapered diameter, it received an
unbalanced load (thrust load) in the pipe-axial direction
equivalent to the difference of the diameters of the two pipes
it connected, under the action of internal water pressure.
During the earthquake, it was estimated that a maximum
internal pressure of 0.3 MPa acted on the pipes. As a result, a
force of about 406 kN was applied to the reducer. The reducer
moved 435 mm toward the Φ2000 mm pipe, and was com-
pletely ejected, as shown in Photo 2. Leakage from the internal
pipe resulted in soil ﬂow, causing a large amount of settlement,
which accounted for an area of approximately 10 10 m2. The
ditch on the ground surface in which the pipes were buried
settled into grooves, causing axial cracking along the boundary
between the backﬁll and original ground. The ground had
Photo 3. Open crack and settlement of the road above pipeline .
Photo 4. Settlement of ground around manhole .
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Fig. 7. Cross section for Yabuki-minami district (red line is after earthquake).
30
4
Floating
Settlement
19
6
30
830
3
20
3
17
8
350
Pooling and clogged Section (mm) 
Fig. 8. Settlement of pipeline around manhole, Yabuki-minami (red line is
after earthquake).
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607592crack widths of 90 mm and a bump height of 900 mm. The
reducer settled 463 mm, and 35 pipes or more (a total length of
140 m) in front of and behind the reducer subsided 200 mm or
more. Their horizontal deﬂections were relatively large, and its
deﬂection rate reached 3.5%, which exceeded the design
deﬂection rate (3.0% of their diameter).3.4. Pipeline around Yabuki minami No. 2 manhole
For the pipeline section at Yabuki-minami, a Φ2200 mm
FRPM pipe was installed underground with a depth of earth
cover of about 2.4 m. The pipe was backﬁlled with sand
equivalent to SF from the bottom to the crown level. The
density of sand backﬁll had a D value of 86.9–90.1% or more,
which indicates a relatively loose foundation.
The road under which the pipeline was installed had a large
open crack 50 cm in width, and had settled over the 1.4 km
line, as shown in Photo 3. According to the measurement, the
cracking in the road surface reached a depth of 1.6 m, while
there was a bump of up to 700 mm between the road and
surrounding ground. The cracking of the road surface occurred
at the center of the pipe (road), and the shoulders on the right
and left banks became lower than the center. This is attributed
to the fact that the pipe ﬂoated and the embankment slope
failed, causing a landslide. As shown in Photos 4, a 1.5 m
bump occurred between the Yabuki minami No. 2 air valve
structure and the ground, and signs of sand boiling were
observed at the boundary between the structure and theground. The cause of the ﬂoating pipe is attributed to the
liquefaction of the backﬁll soil, but no large-scale sand boiling
was observed on the road surface. As shown in Fig. 7, the road
for pipeline maintenance was constructed above the pipe under
the embankment design, ensuring the given overburden.
However, the road has complicated crossing structures, such
as in close proximity to the embankment for the JR Tohoku
Line (JR's ﬁll is 5 m from the toe of the slope on the right
bank). The JR embankment also meandered and subsided,
resulting in a stoppage of train operations. A landslide
occurred on the part of the slope in the left bank. It was
suggested from this behavior that the liquefaction of the
backﬁll sand for the pipe induced settlement and the landslide
of the embankment above the pipe.
The pipes connected to the air valve structure, shown in
Fig. 8, were greatly deformed. The pipe at the joint was ejected
350 mm, while the pipes connected to the upstream and
downstream sides of the structure settled 363 mm and
338 mm, respectively. Pipes with a total length of at least
130 m ﬂoated more than 100 mm. The horizontal deﬂection of
the pipe was measured at ﬁve representative points. The results
showed that its deﬂection was 16 (deﬂection rate of 0.7%) to
65 mm (2.9%).3.5. Restoration methods
3.5.1. Damage conditions
Along the whole 17.8 km of pipeline, three locations
completely lost their water-sealing performance. The prob-
ability of occurrence of displacement was 0.07% (3/4033).
Among the 149 pipes, as shown in Table 1, the deﬂection and
movement at their joints exceeded the speciﬁcation values.
Speciﬁcally, there were 40 pipes (40/1584¼2.5%) that
exceeded the allowable deﬂection rate of 5%, and 109 pipe
Table 1
Damage situations and number of damaged points.
Damage situation Number of damaged points
Slip out of joint 3
Pipe deﬂection rate was 5% or more of its diameter. (allowable deﬂection rate) 40
Joint-to-joint space was the allowable value or more. 109
Joint-to-joint space fell within the allowable value, and the joint leaked in a seal test. 4
Joint space at the joint ring was the allowable value or more. 1
Eccentricity and expansion of a ﬂexible pipe were allowable values or more. 0
Depth of water retained in a pipe due to the pipe's unevenness was 50 mm or more. 77
Ancillary facilities ﬂoated or settled. 11
Diversion and blow-off pipes were deformed. 7
Exteriors and pavements around the ancillary facilities were deformed. 9
Road surface above a pipe was deformed. 26
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Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607 593joints (109/1384¼7.9%) that had a deﬂection exceeding the
allowable value. This type of serious damage to the pipeline
can be attributed to the fact that the bodies of the pipes ﬂoated
or meandered due to the liquefaction of the backﬁll sand,
which caused the settlement of the structures and local
deformation or ejection of the pipes. For example, a pipeline
section under a road or a slope that forms the embankment was
dragged along with the slope failure. In particular, the road
embankment collapsed due to liquefaction of backﬁll sand for
the pipeline that was installed in the bottom of the road
foundation. This suggests that it is important not only to select
the appropriate backﬁll materials for the pipeline, but also to
take the effect of the backﬁll on the surrounding structures and
slopes into consideration when designing the pipeline.
3.5.2. Restoration strategy
In order to ensure the structural safety of damaged pipelines
and maintain their proper hydraulic functions, (1) pipe
replacement; (2) repair work by sealing band at joints; and
(3) other countermeasures were selected according to the
degree of deformation.
In the section of pipeline where the sand equivalent to SF
was adopted as the backﬁll material for the pipes, the grain-
size distribution of the sand shows a high risk of liquefaction.
This sand is considered incapable of fully mobilizing its
resistance to liquefaction, considering the degree of local
compaction (a D value of 88–99% when compared with the
standard Proctor maximum density). Fig. 9 (Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2009) shows the relation-
ship between the liquefaction stress ratio (θ¼σd/2σc, σd: the
amplitude of repeated deviator stress, σc: consolidation stress)
of sand used as backﬁll material and the degree of compaction
of the sand in the pipeline districts that were previously
damaged by an earthquake. These types of sand (SC, SM
and SF materials) which are speciﬁed as quality backﬁll sand
in the Design Standard (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries, 2009), in case of liquefaction stress ratio of 0.4 or
less and D value of 95% or less, are not considered to have
sufﬁcient density in order to avoid liquefaction for severe
earthquake like as the 2011 off the Paciﬁc Coast of Tohoku
Earthquake. Since the backﬁll sand in the relevant district has aD value of about 90%, the liquefaction stress ratio of the sand
is estimated to have been about 0.2–0.3. Based on the above
discussions, it was decided that crushed gravel is the most
suitable for use as backﬁll in order to improve the resistance to
liquefaction in restoring the damaged pipeline sections. Also,
in facilities with settlement or ﬂoating of concrete structures,
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607594such as manholes, crushed gravel was installed around the
entire structure, as shown in Fig. 10.
The reducer in the Gohonmatsu section was completely
ejected because the ground could not fully exert sufﬁcient
passive earth pressure against the thrust load on the reducer.
However, the following factors must be considered: (1) the
backﬁll sand lost its strength due to the increase in excess pore
water pressure, and (2) the dynamic water pressure during the
earthquake was loaded on the reducer. It is important to fully
ensure the material's strength during an earthquake. Conse-
quently, the method shown in Fig. 11 was adopted. Namely,
crushed gravel was used as the backﬁll material in order to
suppress the loss of material strength during an earthquake.3.5.3. Measures against deformed joint in case of the joint
exceeds its allowable value
A pipeline with joints absorbs the ground deformation and
vibration of the structure through the expansion and contrac-
tion of the joints in order to ensure its safety. For this reason,
the construction management criteria (Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries, 2005) specify the joint-to-joint spacesoil-cement
backfill crushed
gravel (C-40)
fiberglass reinforced
 plastic mortar(FRPM)
Fig. 11. Backﬁll around reducer.
Table 2
Damage levels of channels for main pipelines and acceptance criteria for restoratio
Level Damage conditions Accep
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n1: Civil Construction Management Standards (Rural Development Bureau, Minand the bending angle of joints to provide a safety margin. In
principle, it is important that the space and the bending angle
must be within these speciﬁcation values, in order to properly
maintain the safety and water tightness of a damaged pipeline
during its in-service period (about 40 years). Consequently,
even pipelines deformed by these ground motions were
estimated to be able to repair so that the pipe deﬂection and
joint-to-joint space, the joint's bending angle, and the pipes'
unevenness fall within the speciﬁcation values, with the aim of
recovering their performance to the structural function level
immediately after their installation. In Table 2, the damage
conditions of the pipelines were classiﬁed under these four
items, and their restoration methods were summarized.(1)n m
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istryFor the deﬂection of a pipe, the allowable deﬂection (5%
of the pipe diameter) that was speciﬁed in the Design
Standard (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,
2009) was used as the reference value.(2) The control criterion for FRPM pipe joints (FRPM Pipe
Association Standard) also applied to the joint-to-joint
space for each diameter.(3) The allowable bending angle speciﬁed in the JIS A 5350
also applied to the joint's bending angle.(4) To deal with unevenness caused by settlement, a construc-
tion management reference height of 750 mm, which was
deﬁned as the speciﬁcation value in the Civil Construction
Management Standard (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, 2005), shall be adopted. However, even if a
pipeline exceeds this speciﬁcation value and longitudinally
ﬂoats or subsides, uniform ﬂoating and settlement of the
pipeline may cause no damage to its hydraulic functions.
For this reason, primary classiﬁcation of damage levelsethods.
e criteria
Restoration
methods
signs of subsidence, cracking, leakage, etc. of ground surface
ed from pipe rupture and joint displacement by earthquake,
rence of leakage.
Pipeline
replacement
xcessive load acts on a pipe due to collapse of upper ﬁll by
, and the deﬂection rate of the pipe body exceeds the
on value※ (5%).
joint is deformed by earthquake, and the joint-to-joint space
e speciﬁcation value 1 or the bending angle exceeds the
value.※2
lacement of a pipe channel causes projections and
s to the longitudinal gradient of the pipe, resulting in the
w-off and air exhaustion functions.
result of a water pressure test on the joint, it is conﬁrmed
is leakage at a point where the joint-to-joint space is the
on value or less and a bending angle is the allowable value
Joint repairjoint is deformed by earthquake, and the joint-to-joint space
e speciﬁcation value or the bending angle exceeds the
value.*The space between the cutting cross section and
the tunnel is ﬁlled with mortar.
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries).
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607 595was be performed as Table 2. Based on the primary
classiﬁcation, the pipeline's hydraulic functions were
checked to determine whether or not ﬁnal restoration was
required, and how to rehabilitate the pipeline. Pipeline
replacement was made at any point in which sand
deposition or air lock may occur that adversely affects its
hydraulic functions. The hydraulic functions could not be
simply judged due to the heavy dependence on diameter
and ﬂow velocity in the pipeline rather than the allowable
value of unevenness of main pipelines shall be 50 mm,
consistent with the construction management standard for
pipes on soft ground. Consequently, an examination
was carried out to determine whether or not the unevenness
of each pipe could be limited to 50 mm or less to
eliminate sand deposition or air lock by the new installa-
tion of a blow-off and manhole at a proper point even if the
pipeline exceeds the speciﬁcation value of 50 mm and
the whole body of the pipeline ﬂoated or subsided
signiﬁcantly.3.5.4. Reuse of existing pipes
Pipes only several years of age were also damaged by this
earthquake. For many damaged pipes, their joints were simply
ejected, while their bodies were not signiﬁcantly damaged. For
these reasons, FRPM pipes that were pulled out for pipeline
replacement meeting the product speciﬁcations were reused.
Regarding product speciﬁcations for FRPM pipes, JIS A 5350
speciﬁes the pipe strength against external and internal
pressures and deﬁnes the detailed dimensions of their joints.
A rubber ring ensures the joints' water-sealing performance,
but there is a high possibility that the ring is damaged
when a pipe is dug out, while it is difﬁcult to verify the
safety of the joints. Consequently, the joint shall be cut off
from the body of the pipe in order to reuse the body itself. An
additional collar joint shall be connected between the
recycled pipes.Mitsumori
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Fig. 12. Locations of investigaThe external pressure test was done to determine whether
the pipe's rigidity and load bearing performance have deterio-
rated over time, but only the average performance of its ring
piece was tested. For this reason, slight damage to the pipe
cannot be veriﬁed. Consequently, a test for internal water
pressure on the pipe was conducted to check for damage to the
interior pipe and damage to the pipe that could not be visually
determined, like small pinhole failures.
The results of the external pressure test for the ring piece
(ϕ2200 pipe used) did not show any anomalies, such as
cracking at 82.1 kN/m (speciﬁcation value of 63.1 kN/m)
during reference deﬂection (5%, 112 mm) and at a test external
pressure (failure load) of 249 kN/m (speciﬁcation value of
184 kN/m). Under a test water pressure, the strain of the pipe
was about 1/4 of the failure strain (14,000–16,000 106),
while there was no leakage or leaching from pinholes in the
pipe body. It was thus determined that these existing pipes had
the speciﬁed performance. An economical and short-time
restoration method was adopted to check the performance of
the pipes that were dug out for replacement and to determine if
the pipes can be reused: an external pressure test for the ring
piece and a water pressure test were conducted.3.6. Summary for pipeline
Not only the periphery of concrete structures, but also the
pipes in the linear sections of the pipeline were seriously
damaged. There were many damage patterns in which the
backﬁll material was subjected to ground motions and lost its
strength, or in which liquefaction ﬂoated pipes and subsided
structures. A damage pattern was also observed in which the
joint between two pipes moved 300 mm or more and the pipes
had completely slipped out. It was reported by Fujita and
Mohri, 2007 in a study on the damage to agricultural pipelines
by past severe earthquakes that the pipes around structures or
bend pipes moved a considerable amount during an earthquake
and constituted a weak point. In the 2011 off the Paciﬁc Coasthana-naka
anohana-kami
Takaratani
su
sadaira
Jukkanda
na-shimo
warabi
Sulkagawa 
city
ushima 
ity
The Pacific O
cean
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ted small dams and others.
Table 3
Properties of the investigated small earth dams.
Name Width of crest
(m)
Volume
(m3)
Hight
(m)
Crest length
(m)
Gradient of slope
(upstream)
Gradient of slope
(downstream)
Reservoir capacity
(m3)
Effective
storage
capacity (m3)
Catchment
area (km2)
Full water area
(km2)
Fujinuma 6 9900 18.5 133 2.8 2.5 1,504,000 1,504,000 8.23 0.2
Aota-shin 3 42,220 8.3 275 2.0 2.0 17,000 17,000 0.22 –
Naka 4.5 20,000 11.4 85 2.2 2.0 35,000 35,000 0.24 0.01
Mitsumori 7.5 265,000 28.5 205 2.0 1.4 720,000 720,000 8.2 0.083
Doumae 2 2268 6 84 – 1.4 36,150 24,100 – 0.01
Ara 2.5 7762 9 75 1.2 1.3 48,000 48,000 – 0.023
Iwane-Oho 3 26,730 7.5 26.4 2.0 1.4 59,000 59,000 2.16 –
Ootani 3 14,220 3.8 288 1.4 1.4 59,000 59,000 0.63 –
Jyanohana-
nakano
3.5 6850 6.4 153 2.0 2.0 55,000 55,000 0.29 –
Jyanohana-
kamino
4.7 7290 5.5 81 – 1.4 24,000 24,000 0.17 –
Ni 5 17,000 8.4 176 2.0 1.8 32,000 32,000 0.18 0.015
Mitsu 2 4700 5 87 1.7 1.7 18,000 18,000 0.63 0.009
Syoubu 7 3800 3.5 105 – 2.0 17,000 17,000 0.1 0.011
Mega 3.5 10,000 6.9 105 2.0 2.0 15,000 15,000 0.36 0.08
Taguwa 3.5 900 3.5 43 2.0 2.2 4000 4000 0.06 0.002
Sasadaira 4 22,400 7.8 180 2.9 2.0 175,700 176,000 0.48 0.052
Futatsu-kami 2 10,630 6.7 127 1.8 1.3 10,000 10,000 1.06 –
Matsuyama 2.5 3100 7 50 1.0 1.5 4500 3800 0.1 0.002
Ara 5.6 5000 5 132 1.4 2.0 25,000 58,000 0.03 0.07
Jitsukanda 4.3 6000 7.5 72 2.0 1.5 38,000 38,000 0.2 0.0106
Karounai 5.2 5200 8 52 1.7 1.4 11,500 3000 0.43 0.004
Yanokuti 3.5 9500 6 120 2.0 2.0 55,000 55,000 0.53 0.025
Toshinaka 2.5 29,540 13 90 1.8 1.8 7350 7000 0.46 –
Jyanohana-simo 3 9030 7 89 1.8 1.3 19,000 19,000 0.29 –
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Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607 597of Tohoku Earthquake, not only structural problems of the
pipes such as the pipe bends and conﬁguration of the structures
but also the liquefaction of the backﬁll material signiﬁcantly
affected the main pipelines. On the other hand, pipes with
crushed gravel as the backﬁll material moved only slightly and
remained stable.
Furthermore, the remaining performance of the existing
pipes was tested to estimate whether or not the pipes could be
reused. The pipes that can be reused shall be buried as
restoration material. The pipelines that have served only for
a short time since the completion of construction have
sufﬁcient strength. The reuse of the pipelines led to signiﬁcant
cost reduction and shortening of the restoration period.
4. State of damage to small earth dams
The small earth dams which were investigated can be
categorized into three classes for the purpose of reporting on
the state of damage to individual small earth dams. They are
(1) breached small earth dams, (2) small earth dams which slid
or cracked, and (3) small earth dams near damaged small earth
dams which were only slightly damaged or were undamaged.
Fig. 12 shows their locations and dimension for those small
dams are indicated in Table 3. In this ﬁgure, the breached
small earth dams are indicated by the symbol “Δ”, the small
earth dams which slid or were cracked by the symbol “□”and
the ones which were only slightly damaged or were unda-
maged are shown by the symbol “○”. Small circles indicate the
locations of all small earth dams in the region. There are no
reports of damage to these small earth dams.
4.1. Breached small earth dams
4.1.1. Fujinuma small dam
The construction of the dam embankment at Fujinuma small
dam began in 1937, but after a temporary suspension of work,
the dam was completed in 1949. It is an earth dam with
maximum section height of 18.5 m, crest length of 133.2 m,
and total reservoir capacity of 1,504,000 m3. From 1977 to
1979, its spillway and parapet were upgraded, from 1984 to
1992, the dam was grouted to prevent leaking and its intake
equipment was upgraded. The dam embankment has not been
upgraded, since it was embanked long before the enactment of
design standards (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956), and theRight abutment
Downstream
Photo 5. Fujinuma smastructural design and construction speciﬁcations of the dam
are those for a small earth dam. The water stored in the
Fujinuma reservoir (Fukushima Prefecture, 2011) overﬂowed
and breached the dam because the reservoir, which was full
when the earthquake struck, experienced the slide failure of the
whole upper embankment from the right to the left abutment
during the earthquake (Photo 5). As a result of the breach,
severe damage to houses located downstream occurred.
The following points were determined by the excavation
exploration of the dam body:(1)ll damThe ﬁll material can be classiﬁed into three embankment
layers according to differences between the soil quality
(top embanking, middle embanking, and bottom embank-
ing), as shown in Fig. 13.(2) The top embankment layer was 6–8 m thick, its material
was generally homogeneous, mostly consisting of gray
coarse sand, and there were few clear traces of a compac-
tion layer or spreading.(3) The middle embankment layer was between 7 and 9 m
thick, consisting mainly of brownish gray sandy silt with
alternating 20–30 cm layers of sand containing yellowish-
gray silt, loam-type clay, and humic silty sand ranging
from black to dark gray, and showed clear traces of
spreading.(4) The bottom embankment layer between 4 and 6 m thick,
consisted mainly of coarse to ﬁne sand contained gravel
including a silt fraction, with alternating 20–30 cm layers
of loam type clay and humic silty sand ranging from black
to dark gray, and showed clear traces of spreading.Left abutment
IReservoir side
after breach.
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607598The foundation ground is a late quaternary sedimentary
layer and a quaternary early diluvium Shirakawa Stratum. The
sedimentary layer is distributed under the dam embankment,
and its maximum thickness is about 7 m.
In an investigation conducted before the earthquake, it was
determined that the average N-value of the top embankment
was 3, the average N-value of the middle and bottom
embankment was 4, and no differences were found between
the top and middle embankment. Laboratory soil tests of the
materials remaining after the earthquake were performed, as
shown in Fig. 14 and Table 4.
The mapping of debris of Fujinuma small dam conﬁrmed
the following ﬁndings.(1)Tabl
Stre
Laye
Emb
FouMost of upper part of embankment was washed away and
most of middle and lower part of downstream embankment
was also washed away.(2) From the movement of the structural elements, ﬁrst
masonry riprap of upper part of embankment fell to the
reservoir and subsequently the surface protection work
from the middle to the right abutment moved substantially
to the reservoir (Fig. 15). It was conﬁrmed that slides
occurred in the direction both of the reservoir and down-
stream judging from the distribution of main scarps, sliding
surfaces and moved layers.0
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Fig. 14. Particle size distribution of embankment materials.
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ngth parameters of embankment materials for Fujinuma small dam.
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ankment Upper part Sandy soil 3
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Bottom part Sandy soil 4
ndation Deposit Humus soil/gravel 13
Weathered fragmental rock Volcanic deposit 19In the Design Standard (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, 2009), the stability of the dam embankment has
to be estimated by a circular slip analysis. The safety factor by
the criteria based method of stability analysis using the soil
strength c' and φ' (Table 4) was 1.15 less than the required
value of 1.2 of the criteria when a seismic force of 0.15, which
is regulated as a severe earthquake district in the Design
Standard (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,
2009) is applied to the upstream direction. The cross section
for analysis is indicated in Fig. 13.
The investigation revealed that the slides could be broadly
classiﬁed into seven stages (Fig. 16). Among these slides, the
upstream slide Nos.1 and 2 triggered the subsequent overﬂow
and erosion and resulted in the failure of the dam (Fig. 17).
The slide failure No.1 occurred in the upper embankment, as
was recognized from the remnant of the structural elements in
the reservoir, as shown in Fig. 15.
The analysis showed that the quantity of sliding failure
towards the upstream side is about 0.81 m in isotropic
condition sliding failure, and that cause of the sliding failure
was only in the inside of the upper embankment (Tanaka et al.,
2012). Earthquake motion for the Modiﬁed Newmark Method
was estimated by a response analysis using nearest earthquake
record from Japan Meteorological Agency data base.4.1.2. Aota shin small dam
The Aota shin small dam, shown in Fig. 18, is a curved
embankment formed by an east side embankment (below, “east
dam”) and south side embankment (below, “south dam”)
which was connected at right angles, with its ﬂood spillway
constructed on the left bank of the east dam and a bottom
conduit installed in the center of the east dam. The dam height
is 8.3 m, and the total reservoir capacity is 17,000 m3, but its
repair history is unknown. Residence houses stand directly
downstream from the east dam.
The reservoir was full when the earthquake struck, breach-
ing the connection point of the east dam and south dam,
discharging all the water in the reservoir (Photo 6). The crest
was cracked over its entire surface including the east dam and
south dam, and the downstream slope of the east dam (left
bank side of the breach) had slide failure. Inundation caused by
the breach passed through the houses to ﬂow into downstream
paddy ﬁelds and small earth dams, but the breach caused no
secondary damage to the residential homes.Wet density (g/cm3) Proctor density (%) Shear strength
c' (kN/m2) φ (deg)
1.70 87.9 14 28
1.55 81.6–87.4 3 38
1.75 86.4–93.7 3 40
1.54 – 18 29
1.80 – – –
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Fig. 16. Integrated map of slides of the Fujinuma main dam (quoted from Tanaka, 2012). Note: The solid lines are existing slide bodies. The broken lines are
estimated slide bodies which were lost by wash out.
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Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607600The results of an investigation of the part left after the breach
have conﬁrmed that the dam has a uniform soil structure made
of clay (Hori et al. 2012). Undisturbed specimens were taken
from the remaining part of the dam and provided for triaxial
compression test, showing that the strength of the dam soil is
cd¼40 kN/m2, and its internal friction angle φd¼28.0. Exam-
ples of the results of using the strength of the dam material
obtained by the triaxial compression test to calculate the quantity
of deformation by the Newmark Method are shown in Fig. 19.
The input earthquake motion used was that recorded at the
Koriyama Observation Station observed by K-NET. The analy-
sis has shown that the sliding displacement δ and the mini-
mum safety factor Fs which were calculated are δ¼0.7 m and
Fs¼0.99 respectively under sliding failure of the upstreamSettlement
0 10 20 30 40 50 (m)
slide 4
slide 2
Sediment
slide 3
Reservoir Downstream
Upper part Middle part Bottom Part
Masonry wall
slide 1
Fig. 17. Following slides after Slide 1.
South embankment
ECollapse
Photo 6. Aota-shin sma
Sliding clacks
0 50 (m)10
Fig. 18. Plan of Aota-shinslope. That is, the settlement of about 0.7 m obtained by the
analysis results is not sufﬁcient to explain the failure of the dam.
4.2. Small earth dams which were cracked or slid
4.2.1. Mitsumori small dam
This is a central core zone type dam with height of 28.5 m
and total reservoir capacity of 720,000 m3. In 1939, the dam
was completed. In 1955, grouting was carried out between
1980 and 1983 to control leakage, accompanied by other
upgrading including raising the dam and improving the spill-
way, surface protection, and water intake works. The dam was
raised by installing a concrete L-shaped retaining wall (vertical
parapet) with height of 1.8 m on the upstream slope shoulder,
and extra banking of 1.8 m was executed on the dam.
The Mitsumori small dam was full when the earthquake
struck, and a longitudinal crack about 130 m long formed on
the crest of dam as shown in Photo 7. On the dam on both
sides of this longitudinal crack, the upstream side settled lower
than the downstream side, forming a step with maximum
height of about 60 cm. The concrete vertical parapet on the
upstream slope shoulder fell slightly, and this deformation
ripped up the masonry directly below the parapet in a scale-
like pattern. On the downstream slope about 11 m below the
crest, the masonry bulged outwards over the entire dam axis
direction (Photo 8). The longitudinal crack on the crest of dam
might actually be two cracks. One could have been caused byast embankment
House
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Fig. 19. Calculated deformation of the Aota-shin small dam by the Newmark method.
Right abutment Spilway
Crack and bump of 60cm
Left abutment
Photo 7. Longitudinal cracks on the crest of the Mitsumori small dam.
Deflection of 
Upstream slope
Photo 8. Deformation of stone protection on the upstream slope of the
Mitsumori small dam.
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607 601the parapet, which was vertically raised, being inclined
upstream by the earthquake, causing tension cracking of the
extra banking. In this case, the damage was limited to around
the extra banking. The second could have been caused by large
sliding failure towards the upstream side of the dam. It was
feared that aftershocks and the rapid drainage of the reservoir
water might induce a sliding failure. In order to conﬁrm the
depth and direction of the crack in the crest, slaked lime
diluted with water was poured into the crack and, after the
crack was colored, a trench was excavated in the cracked part
of the dam. The results conﬁrmed that the crack had advanced
to a depth of about 4 m in the vertical direction from the crest
as shown in Fig. 20. Therefore, it revealed that the deformation
of the masonry was limited to the masonry layer being
displaced downwards locally by the earthquake, but largesliding failure deformation impacting the entire upstream slope
did not occur. It was also conﬁrmed that although the vertical
crack reached the impervious core, the damage was almost
completely limited to the external banking.4.3. Classiﬁcation of damage patterns
The characteristics of earthquake damage to small earth
dams is shown in Fig. 21 shows the frequency distribution by
damage pattern. The disasters tended to involve multiple
damage patterns, so Fig. 21 includes more than one type of
damage per site.
0 5 10 15 20
Settlement of crest
Sliding failure of upstream slopes
Siding failure of downstream slopes
Crack to longitudinal section at crown
Crack to cross section at crown
Deformation of upstream slope…
Damage of outlet conduit
Damage of spillway or inlet etc
Leakage at downstream slope
Damage of reservoir basin
Collapse
Number of small earth dam
Fig. 21. Affected rate by damaged pattern for small dam.
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Fig. 20. Cross section of the Mitsumori small dam and depth of the
longitudinal crack.
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The settlement of the crest is caused by compression due
to shaking or the upstream/downstream movement of the
sliding mass.(2) Sliding failure/bulging of upstream slopes.
This is the second most common type of damage
pattern. During an earthquake, cyclical loading reduce
the strength of the dam soil, resulting in shear failure on
saturated upstream slopes.(3) Sliding failure of downstream slopes.
In many cases where sliding failure of downstream
slopes has occurred, the upstream slope is also deformed,
accompanied by settlement of the crest.(4) Longitudinal cracking section at crest.
This was the most common damage pattern. Longitudinal
cracks on the crest can be classiﬁed into two types. One type
occurs vertically when the dam shakes in the upstream–
downstream direction, producing deformation and settle-
ment in the crest. The other is caused by the sliding failure
of either the upstream slope or downstream slope.(5) Transverse cracking at the crest.
Cross-sectional cracks at the crown occur in the down-
stream–upstream direction of a dam. They often occur on
bends in the dam or connections with the natural ground.
Continuous cracks in the upstream-downstream direction
of a dam are caused by differencial settlement of the dam
and natural ground, causing severe leakage.(6) Deformation of upstream slope protection and the riprap.
A phenomenon characteristic of this disaster is the
toppling of the riprap. In the area investigated, where
many riprap are protected by either a vertical or steeply
inclined concrete retaining wall, many toppled.4.4. Summary of small earth damsAs seen in past earthquake damage, damage patterns
included longitudinal cracks and downstream slope sliding
failure on many dam bodies accompanied by sucking out of
dam soil as a result of toppling of bulwarks on steep slopes and
the breakage of bottom conduits. Only minor damage was
noted in the embankment of the Yanokuchi small dam, located
just 2.3 km from the Fujinuma small dam, most likely because
upgrading, done since about 1993 limited the damage. There-
fore, it can be assumed that earthquake resistance performance
has been provided to the small earth dams which had been
upgraded in recent years by the seismic design method and
construction technology.
5. State on damage to dams
The Nishigo dam (dam height¼32.5 m, zone type earthﬁll
dam, active storage capacity¼3,064,000 m3) was completed
by 1955 and the Hatori dam (dam height¼37.1 m, zone type
earthﬁll dam, active storage capacity¼25,951,000 m3) also
was completed by1956. The following are reports on the
results of investigations of the the Hatori dam and the Nishigo
dam in Fukushima Prefecture, which have been in use over the
long term, exceeding half a century.
5.1. The Hatori dam
5.1.1. Outline of the dam
The Hatori dam has the largest surface area of reservoir and
the largest amount of storage capacity of all earth dams in
Japan. The water storage efﬁciency of the Hatori dam is very
good because it is a small volume dam. A typical cross section
of the Hatori dam is shown in Fig. 22. The strength parameters
of the embankment material of the Hatori dam were c¼0.41
kg/cm2, φ¼81 at the upstream side of dam and c¼0.88 kg/
cm2, φ¼151 at the downstream side of dam. A minimum
safety factor against sliding by the slip circle method, that is
simpler than stability calculation of present design basis, was
1.70 on the upstream slope, and 4.46 on the downstream slope
by these strength parameters (Masukawa et al., 2012).
5.1.2. State of damage
The following three types of damage were conﬁrmed after
the earthquake. (1) Cracks at construction joints of asphalt
pavement used for the prefectural road on the crest of dam. (2)
Opening at the joints of the parapets and displacement in the
horizontal direction and/or the upstream–downstream direction
of the parapet in the both side of the joint. (3) Deformation
with a crack directly below the slope shoulder on the down-
stream of the dam. The quantity of seepage increased after the
earthquake, but because it was corresponding to time when the
snow melted at the earthquake, it is difﬁcult to conclude that
the seepage increased only as a result of the impact of the
earthquake. Turbidity of the seepage water was not observed.
The degree of compaction of Zone 1 (impermeability zone)
was between 88 and 93%, while the degree of compaction of
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Fig. 22. Typical cross section of the Hatori dam.
Photo 9. (a) Crack of asphalt pavement road on the crest of the Hatori dam and (b) trench investigation at the cracks on the crest of dam (Tohoku Regional
Agricultural Administration Ofﬁce).
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upstream and downstream sides of Zone 1 and Zone 3 formed
the upstream and downstream slope, was 99%, obtained by in-
situ density test at an exploration trench and compaction test in
a laboratory. The results of the triaxial compression test were
c¼20 kN/m2 and φ¼331 for Zone 1, and c¼14–17 kN/m2
and φ¼34–351 for Zones 2 and 3.
5.1.3. Crest of dam
On the crest of dam to right abutment from the center part of
the crest, there was cracking of the asphalt pavement con-
struction joints located in the centerline of the road on the crest
of dam (Photo 9). The maximum opening width of the crack
was 53 mm on the right abutment at the crest of dam, and the
maximum level difference of the crack that had fallen in the
downstream was 21 mm. A 30 mm wide crack on the surface
of the embankment material (Zone 2) in the center part of the
crest of dam, which was located directly below cracking of
asphalt pavement, was conﬁrmed to extend to a depth between
2.45 m and 2.7 m by an exploratory trench. The direction
where crack progresses were vertical, but at greater depth, it
bent slightly downstream.
In the parapet of the 40 m section at the center part of the
crest of dam, settlement up to 79 mm and pushing out to
upstream of 78 mm occurred. Parapet connecting blocks were
cracked and broken, with maximum crack length of 1 m and
12 mm wide breakage of blocks. On slopes lower in elevationthan the connecting blocks of the parapet work (riprap), no
deformation such as cracks, breakage, or bulging was
conﬁrmed.5.1.4. Downstream slope
Towards the right abutment from the center part of the crest
of dam, open cracks parallel to the dam axis formed on the
downstream slope of 2–3 m below the downstream shoulder of
the crest of dam. The largest deformation was cracks with
width of 120 mm and level differences of 220 mm (r upstream
side fall) at the right abutment side of the crest of dam (Photo 10).
In the exploratory trench, this crack had a maximum depth of
1.40 m.5.1.5. Restoration plan for the Hatori dam
The dam embankment above the foundation of the present
parapet will be horizontally removed. The width of the crest of
dam restored embankment must ensure the speciﬁed road
width because the crest of the dam is used as a prefectural
road. As such, the dam center of the crest will be moved about
5 m in the downstream direction and a surcharge embankment
will be constructed on the downstream slope, as indicated in
Fig. 23.
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5.2.1. Outline of the dam
A typical cross section of the Nishigo dam is shown in
Fig. 24. The stability of the dam was evaluated by the simpler
slip circle method as well as the stability calculation of thePhoto 10. (a) deformation at the top of downstream slope of the Hatori dam
and (b) ramp crack on downstream slope (Tohoku Regional Agricultural
Administration Ofﬁce).
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Fig. 23. Section of restoration works at thHatori dam. A safety factor against sliding at F.W.L. was 2.4
on the upstream slope by c¼0.5 kg/cm2 and φ¼151.
5.2.2. State of the damage
The following three kinds of deformation were found on the
Nishigo dam. (1) Ramp, subsidence, slipping of riprap, and
bending of concrete frames on the upstream slope of the dam,
(2) cracks in the dam axis direction on the crest of dam, and (3)
settlement of a parapet on the upstream shoulder of the crest of
dam and opening and level differences between the dam
embankment and the foundation of the parapet. The degree
of compaction of the clay, which is the impermeability zone of
the dam, was between 80 and 95%, and that of the semi-
permeability zone was between 86 and 95%, obtained by an
in-situ density test at an exploration trench and a compaction
test in a laboratory. The strength parameters of the embank-
ment material obtained by triaxial compression test were
c¼17 kN/m2 and φ¼371 for the impermeability zone, c¼14
kN/m2 and φ¼391 for the semi-permeability zone and c¼15–
21 kN/m2 and φ¼36–381 for the permeable zone.
5.2.3. Upstream slope protection work
A horseshoe-shaped pocket with maximum settlement of
550 mm was formed on the upstream slope below 2 and 3 m
from the parapet foundation. This pocket appeared by moving the
riprap materials to downwards. A concrete frame installed on the
slope below this deformation was bent downwards, the boulders
has risen at the concrete frame that was bent (Photo 11). Backﬁll
consisting of small round gravel, which was embanked parallel to
the slope, existed under the bottom of the boulders in the three
exploratory trench of the upstream slope. An embankment with a
thickness of about 1 m, including a continuous softened layer
with a high water content, was embanked in parallel to the slope
under the backﬁll. The average degree of compaction of this
embankment was about 75%, obtained by an in situ density test at
an exploratory trench and a compaction test in a laboratory. The
embankment under the approximately 1 m thick embankment
was well compacted clay. The cone penetration resistance of this
embankment ranged between 1000 and 1500 kN/m2 in situ, andbankment
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Fig. 24. Typical cross section of the Nishigo dam.
Photo 11. Horseshe-shaped pocket and bending of concrete frame on upstream slope of the Nishigo dam.
Photo 12. Open cracks along dam axis direction on the crest of the
Nishigo dam.
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the results of the in situ density test at an exploratory trench and a
compaction test in a laboratory. This embankment is equivalent to
a permeability zone.5.2.4. Crest of dam
One to three cracks with maximum opening width of
500 mm formed parallel to the dam axis in a section equal to
about 2/3 of the dam crest (Photo 12). An exploration trench
on the dam crest revealed that the maximum depth of the
cracks was 2.75 m, and that although the cracks approached
the boundary of the clay and the cover layer, the cracks did not
reach the clay (Photo 13). The embanked soil around the
cracks was well compacted. Below the ends of the cracks, cone
penetration resistance of about 1000 kN/m2 was obtained.5.2.5. Parapet work
Settlement and tilting of the concrete parapet works were
visually conﬁrmed. At the tops of the parapet works, there was
a tendency for settlement up to 360 mm to occur from the
design elevation at the center part of the crest of dam.
Openings and level differences at the connection of the parapet
foundation and upstream slope included maximum openings of
70 mm near the center part of the crest of dam and maximum
level difference of 240 mm near the left bank.
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–6076065.2.6. Restoration plan for the Nishigo dam
As well as restoration with the Hatori dam, the parapet will
be removed and the dam will be horizontally removed to the
depth reached by the cracks opened on the crest of dam. ThePhoto 13. Surface of trench sides at open cracks on the crest of the
Nishigo dam.
Semi pervious
Semi-perviou
Dam cent
before res
EL.648.00m
Take off this riprap
Fig. 25. Section of restoration works atupstream slope will be removed to a depth of 2 m, which is
equivalent to the boulders, backﬁll and embankment con-
structed in parallel to slope on the entire slope surface. In order
to ensure the crest elevation and width, the restoration
embanking on the upstream slope will obtain restored embank-
ment gradient of 1:3.0, which is gradient equal to the present
slope gradient, but above the design ﬂood water level, it will
be 1:2.0. That of the part of the downstream slope which will
be removed will be reconstructed to a slope of 1:2.0 (Fig. 25).
6. Conclusions
Pipelines and small earth dams, other dams incurred a
variety of different types of damage in the Tohoku Region. A
considerable amount of damage was conﬁrmed on small earth
dams, mainly on the main pipeline backﬁlled by sand and
installed in the soft ground foundation, which were not
designed and constructed according to modern seismic design.
An inspection and repair project performed to clarify the state
of deterioration of small earth dams at 210,000 locations was
effective, but there is an urgent need to carry out further
earthquake resistance countermeasures. It is also essential to
identify facilities at other dams which also do not meet present
standards related to seismic performance and to complete
countermeasures. The following are the results of a damage
survey of these investigations.(1)s
I
Cut
Crus
er 
torati
the NEmbankment dams planned, designed, and constructed at
the dawn of the establishment of modern embankment dam
design and construction, before the establishment of
stability evaluation under the present earthquake load,
were not seriously structurally damaged. That is, their
water cutoff, storage and discharge functions remained
intact.(2) The most characteristic damage noted in dams and small
earth dams was open cracks in the crest of dam along the
dam axis.(3) Among the total of 65,100 small earth dams, 48,500 were
constructed before seismic design was established. It is
now necessary to perform an earthquake resistance diag-
nosis of each of these dam bodies and to develop efﬁcient
countermeasure technologies.mpervious
Semi-pervious
 off crest EL.
Restoratio enbankment
Dam crest(EL.653.30m)
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Dam center 
for restorationon
Semi-pervious
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ishigo dam (planned in 2011).
Y. Mohri et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 588–607 607The large-diameter pipes received ground motions
from seismic intensity of Upper 6. The ancillary concrete
structures backﬁlled by sand, which was concrete man-
hole and thrust block, were seriously damaged, including
the settlement of structure and ejection of joint of
surrounding pipes. Pipes with crushed gravel backﬁll
were not damaged because no liquefaction took place in
the backﬁll.Acknowledgments
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